824c1cf · 1,311 commits · 111 files
Issued 2026-09-25
Reads strong: 4 of 6 rated dimensions are strong, 2 are adequate and none is significant.
94 checks ran across 6 assessable dimensions. Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity and Product & Engineering Maturity are adequate. 2 findings, each with evidence. One dimension cannot be assessed without an acquirer.
- Words about people are today's: bands rather than exact shares, dates or day counts, and what the history measured rather than why.
| Dimension | Rating | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 01 | Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance | strong | |
| 02 | Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity | adequate | |
| 03 | Organization & Key-Person Risk | strong | |
| 04 | Product & Engineering Maturity | adequate | |
| 05 | Security & Reliability Posture | strong | |
| 06 | Observability & Operations | strong | |
| 07 | Fit with the Acquirer | not assessable |
- 5% of non-merge commits carry any trailer at all
- low trailer coverage: the convention may not be in consistent use
- no widespread author/committer date divergence
- deep scan blamed 110 of 110 counted files
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
01 · strong · ratings ↑No finding. 11 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
02 · adequate · ratings ↑Almost no process scaffolding exists in the repository
adequateOf five ordinary markers — CI workflows, CODEOWNERS, a pull-request template, pre-commit hooks, contribution guidance — 1 is present: CI workflows. Branch protection itself is a GitHub setting rather than a file, so this is a reading of proxies and not of the rules themselves. What it does establish is that the process is not written down anywhere a new engineer would find it.
| process-scaffolding | 1 of 5 markers present across 111 tracked files |
Respond to this finding
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An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
Organization & Key-Person Risk
03 · strong · ratings ↑No finding. 9 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.
Product & Engineering Maturity
04 · adequate · ratings ↑Change keeps returning to the same few files
adequateFive files out of 453 absorb 29% of all file-level change. Concentration like this is where debt is usually being serviced rather than repaid: the same code is reopened because it is load-bearing, fragile, or both. A repository cannot tell you which — that is a conversation with the team.
| touch-count | package.json — 264 commits touched it |
| touch-count | lib/application.js — 182 commits touched it |
| touch-count | lib/response.js — 124 commits touched it |
| touch-count | lib/context.js — 121 commits touched it |
| touch-count | Readme.md — 114 commits touched it |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
Security & Reliability Posture
05 · strong · ratings ↑No finding. 28 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.
Observability & Operations
06 · strong · ratings ↑No finding. 15 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.
Fit with the Acquirer
07 · not assessable · ratings ↑Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository. What a person adds here.
Check it on the running system
1 check against the running system follow from the findings above: what a buyer's engineer will try, how to run it first, and what to have ready. A paid survey of this repository includes them.
What a person adds
The survey reads what the repository can show. The code cannot settle these questions, and on them this report states nothing. Each says where its answer lives: your own engineer, the company, or an assessor you choose can settle it. Questions marked measured open with something this repository shows.
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
01 · full coverage- Is the architecture right for the next three years of the product?
- Were the home-grown components reasonable choices when they were made, and are they now?
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
02 · high coverage- Is review real or a rubber stamp? Comment depth and time to approve need the pull request history.
- Is delivery planned and measured, or heroic?
- How are incidents run, reviewed and learned from?
Organization & Key-Person Risk
03 · partial coverage- measured 268 people have committed here. Which of them are you acquiring, and which are you replacing?
- Who mentors whom, and would that survive a departure?
- Can the team grow, and who stands behind the top three contributors?
- Is the seniority mix sound, and will pay survive your salary bands?
- Is the pace sustainable? Commit times cannot say: git keeps no reliable local time.
- Does the team want to stay after close?
- How are decisions made and disagreements resolved?
Product & Engineering Maturity
04 · minimal coverage- Can this team deliver the stated roadmap on the stated timeline?
- Does leadership know about the debt, and is time budgeted to repay it?
- Is the engineering shape consistent with the commercial story?
Security & Reliability Posture
05 · partial coverage- What has actually broken, how often, and how badly?
- What did external testing find, and was it fixed?
- What is the SOC 2, ISO 27001 or GDPR status, and where is the evidence?
Observability & Operations
06 · partial coverage- Are the dashboards opened, the alerts acknowledged and the pages answered?
- Are the service-level objectives actually met?
- Who carries the pager, and how often does it go off?
- What does it cost to run, and how much headroom is there?
Fit with the Acquirer
07 · none coverageNot rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.
- This is primarily a JavaScript codebase. Does your engineering organisation already run JavaScript in production, or would this be the first?
- The bulk of this system sits in lib/, test-helpers/. Which of your existing systems would each of those have to absorb or replace?
- Nothing in the repository says how this is deployed. Is it shipped as a library, a binary or a service, and if it runs somewhere, who owns that environment?
- What is your tolerance for the findings above remaining unaddressed for the first two quarters after close, given everything else that will compete for this team's time?
- Which of these systems duplicate yours, and which get retired?
- What will integration cost, and in what order?
- Where does the team land in your organisation, and who reports to whom?
- Are there earn-outs, retention packages or contractor IP to assign?
- Do customer contracts limit hosting, regions or vendors?
A human assessment is Borehole's own paid service, €12,000+ (total price is determined per engagement; travel billed at cost). It is not independent of this report: the same business produced both. It is a separate contract, with its own scope, terms and reliance.
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[](/r/koajs/koa/824c1cf)If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.
Rejection log — 92 signals that ran and did not fire
Appendix: rejection log — 92 signals that ran and did not fire
Published on purpose. A signal that looked and decided not to fire has told you something, and this is the calibration data behind every threshold above.
Looked, and found nothing — 50
| Signal | What it found |
|---|---|
| 04.debt_markers | debt markers are sparsemarkers 2 · per kloc 0.17 · lines read 11,625 |
| 04.dependency_sprawl | direct dependency counts are unremarkable |
| 04.churn_trend | rework is not rising against new worklate delete per insert 0.742 · early delete per insert 0.561 |
| 06.telemetry_presence | this repository does not deploy a running service, so instrumentation is not expected of itbasis nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere · files read 105 |
| 06.structured_logging | not a running service; structured logging is not expected of a librarybasis nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.healthcheck_presence | not a running service, so a health endpoint is not expectedbasis nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.migrate_on_start | migrations do not run at container start |
| 03.contributor_concentration | no single contributor dominates the last 24 monthsyears 13.1 · window last 24 months · authors 268 |
| 03.active_contributors | more than one contributor active in the trailing yearall time 268 · active 12mo 18 |
| 03.knowledge_silos | every substantial directory has been touched by more than one personauthors 269 · directories 3 |
| 03.drive_by_contributors | an open contributor base, where one-commit contributors are normalauthors 268 · one off share 0.78 |
| 03.contributor_attrition | no contributor dominates enough for their absence to matterauthors 268 · top share less than a quarter · top contributor last committed more than three years ago |
| 03.critical_path_ownership | more than one person changes the critical pathsauthors 28 |
| 02.merge_discipline | a meaningful share of recent change carries evidence of reviewmerges 0 · window last 24 months · with tracked 3 |
| 02.ci_presence | CI configuration is present in the working treecount 2 |
| 02.test_presence | tests are present in a normal proportion to sourcetests 73 · source 82 · test ratio 0.89 |
| 02.release_cadence | tags are presenttags 125 |
| 02.conventional_commits | commit subjects generally carry contentsampled 1,147 · low content share 0.106 |
| 02.ci_runs_tests | CI invokes a test runnerconfigs 2 · with tests 1 |
| 02.skipped_tests | few tests are switched offfocused 0 · skipped 0 · test files 74 |
| 02.ci_test_gating | no test run in CI is written so that it cannot failconfigs 2 |
| 02.dependency_update_cadence | dependencies move with the codelockfiles 1 · commits since 4 · days since lockfile changed 26 |
| 02.flaky_test_markers | tests are not retried until they passtest retries 0 · suite retries 0 |
| 01.burst_import | no commit run met both the rate and the net-addition thresholdgap seconds 180 · min add ratio 3.0 · min net added 2,000 |
| 01.initial_dump | first commit is not a disproportionate share of the codebaseinsertions 3,012 · share of insertions 0.0376 |
| 01.message_uniformity | commit subjects vary in wording and lengthlength stdev 19.59 · repeat share 0.067 |
| 01.revision_depth | most files were revisited after they were first writtenfiles seen 456 · write once share 0.458 |
| 01.oversized_modules | no module is an outlier against this codebase's own normlargest 1,173 · threshold 1,000 · median lines 44 |
| 01.swallowed_errors | errors are rarely thrown awayloc 11,729 · files 0 · per kloc 0.0 |
| 01.unfinished_migration | no language migration is stalled halfway |
| 01.weights_in_git | no model weights are committedfiles 0 |
| 05.committed_secrets | no credential-shaped strings outside test and fixture pathsnote the working tree only; the history is 05.5 · patterns 7 · files read 105 |
| 05.security_guardrails | at least one standard guard rail is configured |
| 05.dependency_pinning | a lockfile is committed, so builds are reproduciblelockfile True |
| 05.license_present | a licence file is presentfound True |
| 05.secrets_in_history | no credential-shaped string was ever added outside test and fixture pathspatterns 7 · truncated False · added lines 76,217 |
| 05.secrets_management_pattern | no environment file is committed outside tests and examplesenv files 0 |
| 05.supply_chain_pinning | third-party build steps are pinned, or fewaction refs 5 · pipe to shell 0 · unpinned third party 1 |
| 05.shell_from_strings | product code does not build shell commands from stringssites 0 |
| 05.unsafe_deserialization | no code-executing deserialiser in product codesites 0 |
| 05.tls_verification_off | no TLS verification is switched off in product codefiles 0 · sites 0 · pinned instead 0 |
| 05.known_vulnerabilities | no locked dependency has a published advisoryadvisories 0 · dependencies 35 · high or critical 0 |
| 05.privileged_workloads | no workload runs privileged or in the host's namespacessites 0 |
| 05.credentials_in_deploy_config | deployment configuration references secrets, never holds themfiles 0 · sites 0 |
| 05.signing_material | no signing keystore or profile is committedfiles 0 |
| 05.license_manifest_conflict | manifest and licence file agree on MITlicense MIT |
| 05.license_vendored_unlicensed | no vendored third-party code is committedcomponents 0 |
| 05.license_grant_unclear | the licence is recognisable as MITclass permissive · license MIT |
| 04.dependency_churn | few dependencies were added and dropped within 60 daysdependencies seen 64 · added in two years 1 · removed within 60 days 0 |
| 04.ci_platforms_dropped | no platform was dropped from CI in the last two years |
Could not conclude, or did not apply — 42
Not a clean result. Each says why it could not answer here.
| Signal | Why |
|---|---|
| 04.test_growth | not enough code written in either half to compare |
| 04.eol_runtime | no pinned runtime version to check |
| 04.fixes_with_tests | too few fixes in 24 months to judge |
| 04.fix_share_trend | fewer than six busy quarters to compare |
| 04.schema_churn | no schema migrations to read |
| 04.compat_layers | a library, whose compatibility code is usually deliberate |
| 04.dependency_redundancy | no JavaScript manifest to read |
| 06.telemetry_depth | not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.print_logging | not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.correlation_ids | not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.error_reporting | not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.alert_rules | not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.deployed_image_floats | not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.probes_identical | no Kubernetes probes |
| 06.single_replica | no Kubernetes deployments |
| 06.environment_branching | not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.release_markers | not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.feature_flags | no feature-flag service; flags may live elsewhere |
| 03.second_contributor_attrition | too little recent history |
| 03.bus_factor_trend | fewer than three active years to compare |
| 03.joiners_and_leavers | too few regular contributors to see a trend |
| 02.revert_share | too few recent commits to judge how often change is undone |
| 02.lint_in_build | too small, or no CI to wire a linter into (02.2) |
| 02.long_lived_branches | too few merges to judge (squash and rebase leave none) |
| 02.commit_size | too few recent commits |
| 01.duplicated_blocks | too few source files to look for duplication across them |
| 01.build_reproducibility | no product Dockerfile to read |
| 01.notebook_outputs | not a data or machine-learning repository |
| 05.container_runs_as_root | no Dockerfile to read |
| 05.outbound_timeouts | not a running service |
| 05.migration_reversibility | too few migrations to judge |
| 05.sql_from_strings | not a running service; a library that builds SQL is doing its job |
| 05.resource_limits | no Kubernetes workload manifests |
| 05.public_env_secret | not a frontend |
| 05.unsafe_html | not a frontend |
| 05.source_maps_shipped | not a frontend |
| 05.cleartext_traffic | not a mobile app |
| 05.dataset_provenance | not a data or machine-learning repository |
| 05.license_copyleft_inherited | no third-party code is committed to this repository, so the licences it depends on are resolved at build time and are not readable here |
| 04.flags_accumulating | few or no feature flags in the history |
| 04.api_versions_coexisting | not a running service |
| 04.deprecations_lingering | a library, which keeps deprecated interfaces for its users |
Anyone can check this report against the authoritative record — click the stamp, or enter 56JH-5ZNQ-JT6F at borehole.dev/verify.
The code commits to the 94 checks this run performed, the bands they produced, and the commit they were read at. It does not cover checks written since.
Put the mark in your README
The image is wrapped in a link to the verification page, so a reader can check it rather than take it on trust. If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.
[](https://staging.borehole.dev/verify/56JH5ZNQJT6F?via=badge)
A survey is a reading by a particular version of the assessor. Older readings are kept rather than replaced, because a verification mark attests to the survey it was issued for — overwriting one would make every code already in circulation read as tampered.
| Read | Assessor | Findings | Band |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-25 · shown | borehole 0.6.1 | 2 | strong |
2 other readings (show)
| 2026-09-26 | borehole 0.7.0 | 2 | strong |
| 2026-09-24 | borehole 0.4.0 | 4 | adequate |
Where this scan ran
This scan ran on ordinary cloud infrastructure (cloud-run), not in a hardware-isolated confidential VM. Nothing about it is attested by Google.
What an attested survey proves, and what it does not.
What this scan did with the repository — 7 steps
Written by the steps themselves as they ran, not described afterwards. A hand-written account of a data flow drifts the first time somebody changes the flow and not the account.
| At | Step | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0s | read repository metadata from the GitHub API | size mb: 3.9authenticated: False |
| 1.1s | cloned the repository to a temporary directory | depth: full |
| 1.6s | read the git history | commits: 1311tracked files: 111 |
| 6.1s | ran the deterministic checks | blame pass: Trueread working tree: False |
| 6.1s | recorded where this scan ran | attested: Falseenvironment: cloud-run |
| 7.8s | kept the facts, never the source, for re-reading under new checks | |
| 7.8s | deleting the working copy |
Total 7.8s ·source content sent off this machine: none · calls to a language model: 0 · the clone was deleted when the survey ended
An automated reading of a repository's code and its history up to one commit, with public advisory records. It may be wrong, it is not legal, financial, investment or security advice, and it does not replace diligence by a qualified person. It is provided for information: nobody may rely on it (Borehole's terms, section 3).